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Summary  findings
Three  dimensions  of public  goods-nonrivalry  of  To  understand  the  role of international  institutions  in
benefits,  the  possibility  of being  excluded  from  benefits,  promoting  IPGs,  one  must  ascertain  the  nature  of the
and the  technology  for  aggregating  public  supply-  good  and whether  it requires  a push,  a coax,  or no
determine  what  kinds  of institutions'  and  transnational  assistance  from  a supranational  structure  or influential
actions  are required  for  their  provision  and financing.  nation(s)  and  agents  (such  as charitable  foundations).
For  some public  goods-especially  those  for  which  the  The  transnational  community  should  explicitly  direct
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United  Nations,  or  the European  Union)  that  directly  or  the community  should  sit back and  let incentives  guide
indirectly  collects  the requisite  fees from  its members  to  the actions  of sovereign  nations.
underwrite  international  public  goods  (IPGs).
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In recent years, the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), and other international
organizations are coming to recognize the growing importance of international public goods
(IPGs) to their missions.'  IPGs possess benefits that spill over national borders so that benefits
extend beyond the country of origin. Provision of these goods represents a novel rationale for
foreign assistance that transcends country-based motives because the donor may also gain from
the good's benefits (Ferroni, 2000; Jayararnan and Kanbur, 1999; Kanbur, Sandler, with
Morrison, 1999; Sandler, 1997). Technology continues to provide new forms of public goods
whose benefits cross political and generational boundaries. 2 When an IPG is purely public,
payers and nonpayers receive its benefits, and one person's consumption does not necessarily
reduce the benefits still available to others from the same unit of the good.  In the extreme case of
global public goods (GPGs), the good's benefits disperse worldwide and may include efforts to
curb global warming, to reduce ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) emission, to map
the human genetic code, or to preserve the earth's biodiversity. IPGs are associated with a wide
range of activities involving the environment, security, financial stability, scientific discovery,
health care, infrastructure, poverty reduction, culture preservation, and research and
development.
Given this heightened interest in the study of IPGs and their allocative and distributional
implications, a key concern is how to finance the provision of these IPGs.  Should the world
community rely on voluntary efforts to finance IPGs at the national level? Should it instead
engineer a collective response? Or should it employ a combination of voluntary national
provision and collective financing? The answers to these questions hinge on the nature of the
public good.2
It is essential to understand that the three dimensions ofpublicness  - excludability of
nonpayers, nonrivalry of benefits, and the manner in which contributions determine aggregate
provision (i.e., the aggregation technology) - influence the possibilities to finance IPGs.  The
aggregation technology is a third dimension of publicness that goes beyond the two classical
properties of nonrivalry and nonexcludability. As such, this third property proves instrunmental  in
understanding policy recommendations (e.g., the use of taxes public provision in the presence of
private provision) and institutional design (Bucholz and Konrad, 1995; Comes, 1993; Sandler,
1997, 1998; Sandler and Sargent, 1995; Vicary, 1990). For some public goods, these properties
are such that a public-sector "push" is needed or else the good will not be financed.  This push
can come in the form of a supranational structure (e.g., the World Bank, the UN, or the European
Union (EU)) that collects the required fees from its members to underwrite the IPGs. The leader
nation(s) might in some instances provide the required push and funding, which may only be
germane initially, since voluntary financing may become adequate as nations gain experience
with an IPG or develops a capacity or need for utilizing the good's benefits.  Other IPGs'
properties may promote market incentives or voluntary contributions so that only a little public-
sector "coaxing" is necessary. For still other IPGs, incentives are consistent with the operation
of markets or clubs, so that no official intervention is required as the IPGs are financed through
nonofficial means with little transaction cost.
To understand the role of international institutions in promoting IPGs, one must ascertain
the nature of the good and whether it requires a push, coax, or no assistance from a supranational
structure or influential nation(s) and agents (e.g., charitable foundations). Resources are scarce
in the international community and a reliance on markets and clubs, when feasible, will lessen
burdens by channeling resources to those IPGs whose financing is the most problematic. At the3
national level, governments support public good provision through taxes levied on its citizens,
but a reliance on taxes imposed by a supranational government on subordinate nations is
typically not an option. 3 Nevertheless, GPGs and IPGs are provided and underwritten either
through charges levied by supranational organizations or clubs, or else through voluntary
contributions.  In many cases, the level of provision of IPGs will be inadequate given their far-
ranging spillover of benefits. Alternative means and institutional arrangements for financing
GPGs and IPGs are the topics of this paper. If the world community is to adequately support
IPGs, then an understanding of these arrangements is absolutely essential.  We inhabit a planet
where, spawned by technology, novel IPGs appear often and present allocative challenges that
must be addressed.
One purpose of this paper is to review some basic principles of public finance involving
national and local public goods that can guide supranational financing of IPGs. 4 A second
purpose is to relate these principles to a taxonomy of GPGs or IPGs that indicates the financing
possibilities for each of five basic kinds of IPGs, distinguished by the nature of their benefits.  A
third purpose is to associate financing possibilities to the aggregation technology whereby
individual contributions determine the overall level of the IPGs. A fourth purpose is to identify
further considerations that can guide a society's quest for efficacious financial schemes. A final
purpose is to show how these financing principles have been put into practice by a variety of
supranational structures and other institutions in their provision of IPGs.  Insofar as there are
myriad public goods, each abiding by diverse financial considerations, there are many facets of
this important question to explore.4
BASIC TAXATION PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCING PUBLIC GOODS
It is instructive to consider some principles of taxation that apply to national provision of
public goods when voluntary or private provision is inadequate. The public sector is involved
with two essential activities: the provision of public goods and the redistribution of income to
satisfy some ethical norm of fairness (Bruce, 1998). Although it is convenient to distinguish
these activities, they are interrelated; thus, the manner in which a public good is provided has
clear distributional consequences, while changes in an income distribution may itself be a public
good.  Two overall principles of taxation guide the financing of public goods at the national level
and can be applied at the supranational level to IPGs.
The benefit principle requires that the recipients of a good's benefits pay their marginal
willingness to pay (MWTP) or the value of their marginal benefit from consuming the good.  If
each consumer pays his or her MWTP, and if the sum of the MWTP collected is equated to the
public  good  's marginal  cost ofprovision,  an optimal level of a pure public  good  is then
provided, since social benefits match social costs at the margin. For pure  public goods where
benefits are nonrival and nonexcludable, agents do not willingly reveal their MWTP so that the
benefit principle may prove impractical to implement.  The failure of the provider to exclude
nonpayers and to monitor use is what makes it exceedingly difficult to tie charges for pure public
goods to the consumers' MWTP. If asked to reveal their MWTP, consumers are expected to
understate their derived pleasure in an attempt to limit their payment for the good. A completely
different situation characterizes a private good for which a person can only acquire the good by
paying its market price.  Agents purchase a private good until their MWTP, captured by the
height of the points on their demand curve, equals the good's price.  This price equals marginal
cost under competitive provision, so that individuals automatically satisfy the benefit principle5
through their voluntary purchases of private goods.
Most public goods are not purely public and permit either some exclusion or else some
rivalry of benefits.  If the public good's benefits can be withheld from nonpayers, then the private
sector may be able to provide the good without public-sector intervention.  Golf courses are both
privately and publicly provided, and the same holds true for parks and schools. For a golf
course, private provision is possible, because each round of golf can be monitored and a fee
charged.  Public provision and financing is best reserved for those situations where exclusion is
inadequate and private provision is not feasible. For some activities, both private and public
benefits are simultaneously derived; schooling benefits not only the individual with (private)
marketable skills, but it also improves social well-being with enhanced demands for culture
and/or law and order.  If these private benefits are a sufficiently large share of total benefits, then
private provision is possible as discussed in the next section. Private provision works best when
the nature of the public good permits fees, collected from users, to be based on a benefit principle
where aggregate MTWP is equated to the good's marginal cost of provision.
A second means for financing a public good when private alternatives are unavailable is
to base the agents' financial burden for the good on their ability to pay in terms of their income
or wealth.  From an administrative viewpoint, an ability-to-pay scheme does not require the
government to ascertain the agents' MWTP schedules, and, as such, is not expected  to achieve an
optimal provision of the public good.  Efficiency is sacrificed for practical implementation. The
actual relationship between ability to pay and assigned burdens reflects alternative notions of
fairness.  One such concept is horizontal equity, which requires people with the same income or
wealth to carry identical burdens for the public good.  Quite simply, equals should be treated
equally.  In the US tax system, the so-called marriage penalty is a clear violation of horizontal6
equity.  An alternative fairness criterion is vertical equity in which agents with higher incomes
are made to finance a greater amount of the public good through taxes or assigned assessments.
This criterion introduces distributional equity founded on an analogy with the utilitarian concept
of diminishing marginal utility of income where a dollar taken from a richer agent has less of an
impact on an agent's well-being than a dollar drawn from someone poorer.
Of these two equity criteria, vertical equity is more prevalent as a guiding influence for
ability-to-pay schemes. Progressive income taxation, where richer people pay a larger
percentage of their income in taxes than poorer individuals, is an instance of vertical equity.
Membership dues to leamed societies that are graduated based on income (e.g., dues in the
American Economic Association and the American Political Science Association)  preserve
vertical equity where the shared public goods are the journals and infrastructure of the societies.
The use of property taxes is another means of applying vertical equity by collecting more in taxes
from those with greater wealth.  I shall show below that vertical equity is also applied by some
supranational structures, reliant on an ability-to-pay financing arrangement. When a push is
needed, governments usually resort to an ability-to-pay arrangement that incorporates some
criteria of fairness.
A TAXONOMY AND FINANCING POSSIBILITIES
There are various taxonomies for public goods in the literature depending on what
purposes and properties of the goods are being studied (see, e.g., Sandler 1999; Kanbur, Sandler,
with Morrison, 1999). In Table 1, five alternative categories of IPGs are distinguished according
to how such goods fulfill the two properties of pure publicness.7
Pure public goods
If the good's benefits are both nonrival and nonexcludable, then the good is a pure public
good.  A good's benefits are nonrival among users when one agent's consumption or use of the
good does not detract, in the slightest, from the consumption opportunities still available to other
agents from the same unit of the good. For example, reducing CFCs or greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions helps stem either the depletion of the ozone layer or else the heating of the
atmosphere, respectively, that affects all nations. If a provider of a public good cannot keep an
agent (e.g., an individual, a firm, or a nation) from receiving the good's benefits, then its benefits
are nonexcludable. The provider cannot, therefore, keep a nonpayer from taking advantage of
the good's benefit, and this inability limits incentives on the part of users to finance the good's
provision.  Again consider the reduction of CFCs and GHGs. Nations engaged in these
reductions cannot deny other nations from receiving the benefits that result. Thus, curbing global
warming and improving the protective stratospheric ozone shield are purely public, because both
activities' benefits are nonrival and nonexcludable.
Two additional examples of pure public goods at the transnational level are limiting the
spread of contagious diseases (e.g., AIDs and Ebola) and uncovering basic research findings.
Efforts to forestall the spread of a contagious disease benefit all those at risk regardless of
whether or not they supported the containment. Additionally, the reduced risk experienced by
one person from prophylactic measures does not limit the safety afforded to others. Once made
public, basic research findings will diffuse rapidly among those with the capacity to understand
them.  Even before being released, information about basic research findings tends to leak out to
the scientific community. The findings are nonrival and can be exploited to advantage  by
countless teams of researchers without diminishing their benefits. For example, the discovery of8
calculus gave a mathematical tool that can be used by one researcher without limiting its
advantage of application to others.
In the two right-hand columns of Table 1, financing possibilities and remarks are given
for each of the five categories of IPGs. Financing is most problematic for pure public goods.  A
best-case scenario would be a leader nation that derives sufficient benefits to justify its provision
of the good even if the costs are solely borne by it. Efforts by the United States to underwrite the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) are such a case. In the absence of a leader nation, the global
community will have to resort to a supranational structure (e.g., the UN) in which members are
subsequently charged based on some ability-to-pay measure.  Currently, there is no transnational
public finance system where taxes collected on, say, internationally traded items (the so-called
Tobin tax) could be earmarked to finance GPGs and IPGs, so that supranational structures must
provide the required push to fund these goods.
With pure public goods, there is always a concern with "neutrality," where collecti ve
provision or financing crowds out voluntary national provision on a dollar-for-dollar basis (see
Warr, 1983; Comes and Sandler, 1996, Chapter 6). Thus, efforts to augment national provision
with  collective  provision  willfail  to increase  overall public  good  supply  if the voluntary
contributors  are made to fund  the collective  efforts.5 This neutrality  or crowding-out  problem
arises because one contributor's provision of a pure public good is a perfect substitute for that
from other contributors. Increased provision, no matter how it is financed, replaces the need to
contribute on one's own. Neutrality has disturbing implications for financing a pure public good
either through income redistribution from small providers to large providers, or tax-financed
official support of IPGs with taxes levied on contributors. Neutrality indicates that engineered
redistributions of income among contributors has no net impact on IPG supply; those receiving9
income merely increase their IPG contributions by the amount that those losing income decrease
their contributions. For purely public goods, contributors view public good benefit spillovers
from others equivalently to extra income. To maintain their well-being, nations merely let the
increased public good supply of others make up for their income losses stemming from taxes or
redistribution.  Only a tax imposed on a noncontributor can result in more of the public good but
at the expense of social welfare if the noncontributor has little taste for the IPG. An efficiency
loss arises because the tax burden on the noncontributor would outweigh any gain derived from
the augmented IPG supply if the noncontributor has little desire for the good.
Another consideration has to do with partial cooperation whereby some nations choose
not to be part of a collective agreement or supranational organization established to provide more
of a pure IPG.  These noncooperators can partly or wholly offset the increased contributions by
deliberately contributing less in response to cooperation-induced  increases in provision
(Buchholz, Haslbeck, and Sandler, 1998). The success of partial cooperative financing of a
purely public good is bolstered by three factors: (i) a large number of cooperating countries, (ii)
noncooperators with a relatively low (high) valuation of the private (public) good, and (iii) a
large proportion of noncooperators, which are minor contributors.  Such factors provide little
ability for the noncooperators, by cutting back on their support for the IPG, to undo the efforts of
like-minded cooperators. Factor (i) implies that there are less noncooperators to counter efforts
at cooperation, while factor (ii) indicates that noncooperators have little incentive to reduce their
IPG provision in response to partial cooperation. Finally, factor (iii) means that only small
cutbacks are possible since noncooperators are minor contributors prior to a cooperative
arrangement, which does not include them. Such a partial agreement can finance the IPG
through cost shares assigned to each country based on ability to pay, since there are no incentives10
to truthfully reveal MWTP.  Even with cost-sharing agreements to supply more of an IPG, an
enforcement mechanism may be required and this presents yet an additional collective action
concern as to how such a mechanism will be financed among the cooperators (Heckathorn.
1989).
Impure public goods
When IPGs possess benefits that are either partially nonrival or partially excludable (i.e.,
excludable at a cost), they are impurely public.  The second category of public goods in Table I
consists of impure IPGs that display some rivalry but whose benefits are still nonexcludable.
Such goods include ocean fisheries where property rights may be difficult to protect or else are
owned in common, so that benefits still have a strong element of nonexcludability. Rivalry
applies because increased fishing efforts limit the catch of others through crowding. That is,
each fishing vessel must exert greater effort to haul in the same catch as the efforts of others
increase.  Controlling pests, curbing organized crime, and alleviating acid rain display rivalry as
efforts by one individual influence benefits available for others.  For pests, control applied in one
place cannot also be applied elsewhere and results in the pest population decreasing where the
action is taken and increasing where it is not.  Efforts directed to thwarting organized crime in
one place may merely displace the criminal activity to a less protected venue so that benefits are
rival through the consumption process.  Improvements to the environment or to security within a
society stemming from these activities are, however, nonexcludable.  Without excludability, this
class of goods may at times be difficult to support through voluntary actions, so that either some
push is needed from a supranational organization or else a leader nation is required. Rivalry,
however, limits neutrality since contributions are less substitutable and there may even result, for11
some cases, sufficient private inducements to promote contributions.  If, for example, a nation's
efforts to control sulfur emissions primarily curtail acid rain over its own territory, owing to a
spatial rivalry (i.e., every ton of emissions dropped on it cannot fall elsewhere), then some
voluntary action can be anticipated (Murdoch, Sandier, and Sargent, 1997).
The remaining three categories of IPGs in Table 1 all have better prognosis for financing
without the need for some elaborate supranational structure, owing either to excludable benefits
or else private nation-specific gains. For these three cases, either a coax or no help is needed
from a transnational public sector.  In the middle of Table 1, impure IPGs with some excludable
benefits are listed. Provision of these goods  - e.g., a missile defense system, disaster relief aid,
extension services, and information dissemination  - can be withheld from nonpayers. Thus,
whether or not a country is protected by a missile defense system or whether it receives extension
services hinges on its own provision or its willingness to pay a provider for these excludable
benefits.  Exclusion promotes voluntary financing and club-like structures where use can be
monitored and charged a fee. Because exclusion is not complete, some suboptimality remains.
Consider information dissemination where it may be difficult to control whether or not one buyer
can freely pass on the acquired informnation  to a nonpayer. Even for missile defenses, protection
may not be denied to a nonpayer when collateral damage to the provider would result from an
attack on the nonpayer. An ideal club arrangement charges a toll to internalize the crowding
externality associated with rivalry, 6 but for this third kind of IPG there may not be rivalry and
this presents a problem - e.g., possession of information by one nation need not result in rivalry
for another if the information can be provided easily whenever needed.12
Club goods
Club goods represent the fourth kind of IPG and holds out the greatest promise for self-
financing without an elaborate structure or guidance from a supranational governmental body.  If
exclusion cost is sufficiently small to allow utilization rates to be monitored and users to be
charged a toll or user fee, then the users can form a club and provide themselves with the shared
good.  Nonmembers are excluded from the benefits of the club good, while members pay a toll
for each use or visit equal to the marginal crowding cost that results.  In this way, the toll
intemalizes the crowding externality and resources are directed to their most valued use.
A member visits the club and pays the user fee only when the member's resulting gain is
at least as great as the toll that must be paid per visit. Even taste differences among members are
taken into account - members with a stronger preference for the club good will visit more often
and will thus pay more in total tolls, so that preferences are automatically revealed. As such,
club members are charged their MWTP and, hence, club pricing abides by a benefit  principle.
For clubs to function properly, there must be an exclusion device that is inexpensive to operate
and there must also be crowding or rivalry in consumption that requires intemalizing.  If the
scale of the club is insufficient to accommodate  all nations, then multiple clubs can be replicated
so that every nation finds itself in an optimal-sized club (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997).7
Clubs provide an institutional alternative to the creation of elaborate supranational
structures or taxing authorities. Given the way that nations cherish their sovereignty, they are
loathe to agree to such supranational taxation as a means of financing IPGs. Clubs are relatively
simple structures that require little more than an exclusion mechanism or a toll booth so that
transaction cost is economized.  Once income or sales taxes are used to finance IPGs, the link
between who receives the goods' benefits and who finances them is severed, so that allocative13
inefficiency results. Through their toll charges, clubs maintain this connection  between benefits
and financing, because only those members whose MWTP justifies paying the toll will use the
facilities, and then only to the point at which a member's MWTP just equals the toll.
Full financing of optimal provision of the club good depends on congestion, production,
and competitive considerations.  The form of the crowding function is an important determinant
in ascertaining whether or not the toll can fully finance the club good (Comes and Sandler, 1996,
pp. 391-393; DeSerpa, 1978; Oakland, 1972). If the crowding function is homogeneous of
degree zero in provision and utilization, so that a doubling of use and facility size leaves
crowding unchanged, then an optimal toll will self-finance the club whenever competitive
conditions  prevail  and production  of the club good  is not under  increasing  returns  to scale.  This
follows because a toll set equal to marginal crowding cost associated with a visit takes in enough
on each unit of the shared good to finance the marginal cost of provision (Siqueira and Sandler,
2001; Small, 1  999).'  If constant cost prevails, then the cost per unit equals marginal cost, and the
proceeds collected on each unit also covers average cost.  The tolls derived from all units
provided will then just cover total provision cost.  When increasing cost or decreasing returns to
scale apply, marginal cost exceeds average cost, and a toll that earns enough to cover the former
will more than finance the shared good. If, however, increasing returns to scale characterize the
production of the public good, then a per-unit toll that finances marginal cost is insufficient to
cover average cost. A two-part toll is then required with the shortfall in financing being made up
by a fixed membership charge.
When competitive factor markets do not hold, there may exist monopsony in the buying
of inputs, which implies a rising factor-supply curve (Small, 1999). For an IPG such as
peacekeeping or peace enforcement, there may be monopsony elements for some factors such as14
titanium used in weapon systems for strength. Such a noncompetitive consideration results in a
toll that overfinances provision as the rising factor-supply curve diminishes economies of scale
of cost thus leading the ratio of average to marginal cost to be less than one.  If the toll per unit
covers marginal cost, it will then cover average cost.
In the fourth row of cells in Table 1, four examples of club IPGs are listed.  Transnational
parks include the Great Barrier Reef off the coast of Queensland, Australia, as well as tracts of
pristine rain forests worldwide.  Even national parks qualify as transnational because of their
international visitors.  Toll schemes are used for these parks as a means for financing land
acquisition, park infrastructure, and park maintenance - i.e., park provision and maintenance.
INTELSAT, a private consortium of nations and firms as members, operates as a club to share a
communication satellite network in geostationary orbit that carries most international phone calls
and television transmissions.  Data from remote-sensing satellites  - e.g., LANDSAT surveying
- are sold to users in a club-like arrangement based on individual demands for surveys.  Canals
and waterways - the Suez Canal and the St. Lawrence Seaway - permit exclusion and
monitoring, thus representing club IPGs.
Joint products
The final category of IPGs, listed in the bottom row of Table 1, consists of joint products
for which activities simultaneously yield two or more outputs that may vary in their degree of
publicness. Joint products may be purely public, impurely public, or private. As nation-specific
private and club good benefits become a greater share of the joint products, market and club
arrangements can be applied to finance the activity, thus eliminating the need for any push or
coaxing from some governmental body.  Suppose that only nation-specific benefits characterize15
the joint products.  Recipient nations'have a clear incentive to reveal their MWTP through
payments for the IPG.  Quite simply, nation-specific benefits, which are private among nations
though possibly public within recipient nations, serve a privatizing influence, not unlike the
establishment of property rights.  Next suppose that both a nation-specific private benefit and a
global pure public benefit are produced jointly by the public activity. If these jointly produced
outputs are complementary so that nations desire to consume them together, then markets can
sell the activity as a package based on a benefit principle applied to the private good component
and use the proceeds to finance the entire activity. If club outputs are prevalent, then these can
be charged tolls (Sandler, 1977). The essential determinant for financing joint products is the
ratio of excludable benefits (i.e., nation-specific and club benefits) to total benefits.  As this ratio
approaches one so that all benefits are excludable, markets and clubs can be employed to finance
the activity without elaborate and costly supranational structures. The closer the ratio is to one,
the more relevant is a benefit principle of financing.
In many ways, joint products may include all of the other categories as special cases.  If,
for example, an activity yields only a single excludable and rival output, then it is a private good;
if, however, it yields only a purely public output, then it is a pure public good.  When an activity
provides both private and public goods, it is neither purely private or public, so that a new
category of goods is needed.  This new class is called joint products.  In practice, many activities
give rise to multiple outputs, which vary in their degree of publicness.
Four cases of joint product IPGs are listed in Table 1. For example, poverty reduction in
the form of foreign assistance can provide donor-specific benefits if the aid is tied or conditional.
Additionally, any poverty that this aid relieves yields a GPG for all richer countries concerned
with the well-being of those less fortunate. Even without conditional aid, a donor can derive16
benefits from an IPG's output that protects its citizens, as in the case of containing an epidemic
abroad with the aim of eliminating it before it arrives on the donor's own soil.  Joint products
also characterize the rain forests, whose preservation generates purely public benefits worldwide
owing to carbon sequestration and biodiversity. Host-country and regional benefits from these
rain forests include erosion control, localized climate effects, watersheds, and ecotourist sites.
Such localized benefits provide these tropical countries with a stake or ownership in their forest
preservation and, in so doing, should motivate some action. Peacekeeping provides nation-
specific benefits for nations nearest to an instability, and also yields more global pure public
benefits to the world community in terms of enhanced political security, reduced trade
disruptions, and the curtailment of human suffering.  Migrations and other collateral effects may
impact nations near areas of conflict. Defense shared among allies provides pure public benefits
by deterring an attack and nation-specific benefits from arrns devoted to curbing domestic
terrorism or maintaining colonial control.
AGGREGATION TECHNOLOGIES OF PUBLIC SUPPLY
To address the possibilities of public good financing, one must consider more than just
the nonrivalry and nonexcludability of benefits. A third essential characteristic of publicness
involves the manner in which individual contributions to the public good determine the total
quantity of the good available for consumption. This relationship between individual
contributions and the aggregate quantity of the public good is henceforth called the aggregation
technology. 9 This aggregation concept influences the incentives that the potential contributors
possess and, in so doing, affects financing and other policy concerns related to the provision of
public goods.  Although there are a rich variety of alternative aggregation  technologies, only four17
are discussed.'° Table 2 indicates four alternative aggregation technologies, examples of each,
strategic considerations, and institutional implications.
Suimmation
The most common technology is that of summation where each unit contributed to the
public good adds identically and in a cumulative manner to the level of the good available to all
for consumption.  Since each unit has the same marginal impact on total provision, one agent's
contribution is a perfect substitute for that of another agent. In Table 2, three examples of a
summation technology are given in the top row. In the case of ambient air pollution such as
methane from agriculture and mining, the total emissions in the atmosphere equal the sum of the
pollutants emitted by various sources. Air quality is cumulatively affected by individual
emissions.  Similarly, efforts to improve air quality by reducing methane emissions correspond to
the sum of individual cutbacks.  The accumulation  of greenhouse gases (GHGs) also abides by
an additive technology of aggregation. If each of 1000 nations emits 500 metric tons of GHGs
into the atmosphere, then 500,000 metric tons result and this accumulation heats the atmosphere.
Each metric ton adds identically to global warming.  When species are catalogued, each species
identified adds a new single entry to the total.
When a classic public good problem is considered, often there is an implicit assumption
that a summation technology applies. This technology was so ingrained in public goods thinking
that, not until Hirshleifer's contribution  in 1983, were other aggregation possibilities and their
strategic implications even considered. Two game forms typically underlie the summation
representation of a public good. First, there is the Prisoner's Dilemma where each potential
contributor has a dominant strategy (i.e., best no matter what the other contributors do) to free18
ride on the contributions of others (Sandler, 1992). This follows because a contributor considers
just the difference between the benefits and costs that he or she derives from a unit contributed -
benefits conferred on others are ignored. Suppose that each unit of the public good provides
each of five potential contributors with 6 in benefits at a cost of 8 to just the provider of the unit.
Even though a unit gives 30 (= 6 x number of persons receiving benefits) in total benefits, a
potential contributor will view the transaction as yielding -2  (= own benefit of 6 - own cost of 8)
and opt not to contribute.  If all potential participants view payoffs like this, then everyone will
free ride and nothing will be contributed. To escape this dilemma for IPGs, one or more nations
must gain sufficient benefits, beyond those of the average nation, to provide the public good.
This may be the case when some contributors are richer and place greater value on the public
good (Olson, 1965; Sandler, 1992). A second escape can come from an organized effort on
behalf of a multilateral organization to collect the necessary funds to provide the public good.
Second, a chicken game can apply for a summation technology where per-unit cost is
again less than per-unit benefit when viewed from an individual contributor's perspective.  The
difference in the chicken representation is that doing nothing at all, or doing too little, results in
negative payoffs - i.e., some of the public good must be provided or everyone suffers. Not
contributing is no longer a dominant strategy. If, for instance, nothing at all is done about a
pollution problem, the consequences may be dire. The same may be the case for an emerging
plague. Now there are incentives for one or more nations to accomplish some minimal sufficient
effort to forestall the disaster. The most likely contributor(s) is (are) the best endowed nation(s)
or else some multilateral agency that can direct efforts.
A summation technology, when combined with nonrival and nonexcludable benefits,
results in financing worries for IPGs and the need for transnational public-sector coordination.19
Weakest-link
For a weakest-link technology, the smallest contribution level fixes the quantity of the
public good for the entire group. When controlling a contagious disease, such as river blindness
(onchocerciasis), a nation expending the least efforts at containment determines the risk to
neighboring nations of the disease spreading by a parasitic worm carried by a black fly.  In
Hirshleifer's (1983) classic paper, the concept of weakest-link was illustrated by dikes along a
circular island, for which flood protection hinged on the height of the lowest levee.  Another
example is the integrity of a network where the least reliable part determines the reliability of the
entire network.  When a nation is confronted with an insurrection, the province with the least
effective defense sets the safety standard of the entire nation by allowing the rebels to gain a base
from which to launch their attacks. Yet another example concerns tracking the progress of a
disease or a pest where the monitoring station least up to the task determines the authority's
ability to know the progress of the disease or pest.  Currently, the United States is seriously
contemplating improving the Russian early warning system, which is in disrepair, so that Russia
never wrongly thinks that it is under attack.
Incentives are more favorable for the international community to supply and even finance
other countries' weakest-link public goods owing to an inherent complementary. For such IPGs,
incentives exist for each nation to match the smallest contribution because larger contributions
use up scarce resources without augmenting  the level of the IPG.  An assurance game applies
where it is in the interest of each nation to match one another's contributions to a weakest-link
IPG because failing to do so makes it worse off (Sandler, 1992; Sandler and Sargent, 1995, p.
153)."  Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma, contracts are self-enforcing since once one nation20
delivers its IPG provision, others can only prosper by doing the same. There is also an
inducement for rich nations to form partnerships with poorer countries so as to raise their level of
a weakest-link IPG to more acceptable standards (Ferroni, 2000; Vicary and Sandler, 2001).
Ferroni correctly indicates that these partnerships are complex and difficult to achieve, but Ilhe
incentives are nevertheless right for doing so. Moreover, it is an easy political sell to the rich
country's constituency that foreign assistance to improve, say, the fight against an infectious
disease provides safety at home. Partnerships to foster the financing of these weakest-link IPGs
can be either bilateral or multilateral. Supranational organizations such as the World Health
Organization (WHO) can coordinate such partnerships. Recognition of weakest-link IPGs
provides a whole new rationale for foreign assistance.  When a wealthy country has both funds
and a comparative advantage in providing the IPG, it is best for it to provide such increases of a
weakest-link IPG directly until the recipient builds up its own capacity (Buchholz and Konmad,
1995; Jayaraman and Kanbur, 1999; Vicary and Sandler, 2001). Over time, a recipient country's
capacity to provide its own weakest-link IPG should be fostered. It is in the interest of donor
countries to build up recipient countries' provision and financing capacity with respect to
weakest-link IPGs.  This is particularly true when a large number of countries have insufficient
capacity.
Best-shot
"Best-shot" represents a third basic aggregation technology for which the largest
cOntribution of an individual sets the aggregate level of the IPG available for consumption.
When finding a cure for AIDS, malaria, or other diseases, the research team expending the
largest effort is most apt to meet with the success that benefits everyone at risk.  Once a cure is21
uncovered, further efforts achieve very little or nothing.  Similarly, engineering a successful
neutralization of a pest through a clever strategy - for example, mating flies with sterile females
released into the environment - eliminates the threat for everyone. Further research and other
strategies are then unnecessary. A third example from Table 2 is the engineering of the next
green revolution, which is likely to be discovered by the team with the greatest research budget
and best scientists. In general, scientific and health breakthroughs abide by a best-shot
aggregation technology.
The underlying game is that of coordination where just a single provider is needed and
potential suppliers must decide amongst themselves which should expend the effort (Sandler and
Sargent, 1995; Sandler, 1998). Coordination problems are particularly tricky when more than
one best-shot candidate are present, because resources may be wasted if multiple efforts merely
duplicate a discovery or fall short of those required to unlock the mystery.  There are a number of
institutional implications associated with best-shot (see Table 2).  Supply efforts should be
concentrated where the prospects and existing resources are the greatest for success. If potential
contributors have equal likelihood of success, then multiple providers may make sense unless
combining contributors' efforts augment this likelihood - a likely scenario with best-shot.  With
best-shot, there is a rationale for assisting the efforts of a rich nation, or forning  a partnership
among diverse participants.  For a best-shot IPG in the health sector, partners might include drug
companies, a host country, rich donor countries, and multilateral agencies. The prognosis is less
optimistic when rich potential donors have less direct interest in a best-shot IPG.  In the case of
malaria, which is ravaging less-developed tropical countries, rich countries have displayed ennui
since malaria poses little threat to their populations.  Seeing little prospect for profit, drug
companies have not until recently put much effort into finding a cure. Such best-shot IPGs that22
do not involve rich countries need financing support from multilateral organizations such as the
World Bank.  Such goods do not possess the right incentives and thus the need for a public-
sector push.  Partnerships can also be spearheaded by such organizations, as in the case of
Medicines for Malaria Venture discussed below.
Weighted sum
A fourth aggregate technology consists of weighted sum for which the weights in the sum
are no longer one in value, as in the case of a summation technology. In fact, weighted sumI
generalizes the latter technology. Individual contributions possess weights, which reflect the
marginal impact that a unit of a contributor's provision has for total provision of the IPG.  For
acid rain, the cleanup of sulfur emissions from power plants and vehicles adheres to weighted
sum, as the location of the source of the pollutants makes a difference on the pattern of
dispersion of downwind depositions owing to wind direction (Murdoch, Sandler, and Sargent,
1997). Countries further from the source of a cleanup receive smaller reductions in their acid
rain deposits, as compared with a less distant downwind neighbor. Monitoring the planet at
alternative vantage points yields aggregate intelligence, whose total is differentially impacted by
the station's location.  Efforts to control a pest may also adhere to weighted sum if the
distribution of the pest is unequal, so that eradication efforts in its stronghold yield greater results
than where the pest is less prevalent. With weighted sum, some nations receive
disproportionately greater benefits and thus possess a large incentive to support the IPG.
Efforts should be channeled to where provision has the greatest marginal impact.
A wide variety of game forms and strategic implications are associated with a weighted-
sum technology.  This follows in part because weighted sum can include summation (all weights23
are 1) and private goods (the weight on the providing nation's provision is 1 and it is 0 on all
other potential recipients).  In the former case, Prisoner's Dilemma or chicken are relevant
underlying games, while, in the latter, incentives exist for the country that benefits to supply its
own private good.  Depending on the weights, assurance or coordination  interactions may apply
where either matching behavior results or some dominant nation or group of nations provides the
IPG.  The greater the country-specific  benefits derived from a weighted-sum IPG (i.e., the larger
the weight on its provision), the greater its inducement to contribute. When weights are no
longer 1, contributions are no longer substitutable, and there is no (neutrality) concern that public
effort, coordinated by multilaterals, crowds out contributions from individual nations.  Thus,
some patterns of weights may promote IPG funding, thereby either limiting the required public-
sector push or making such a push more effective when needed.
Multilaterals can further these self-financing incentives by providing the information
required to compute the weights.  This is precisely what the Cooperative  Programme for
Monitoring and Evaluation (EMEP) has done in Europe. Funded by the UN, EMEP has
determined the weight matrix associated with sulfur emissions, nitrogen oxides, and other
pollutants.
Thus, this third property of publicness has much to say about whether or not incentives
are supportive of voluntary provision and financing of an IPG. When financing is unlikely, these
technologies help define the role that a supranational structure or a nation's leadership can play
in collecting the necessary financing.
TWO ADDITIONAL FINANCING CONSIDERATIONS24
Economies  of scope
In practice, many supranational structures address more than a single IPG allocation
problem.  For example, the World Bank not only gives out foreign assistance to alleviate poverty
and promote development, but it also produces basic research. The United Nations promotes
peacekeeping, alleviates hunger, tracks population growth, furthers world health, and facilitates
environmental protection.  2 Even a military alliance like NATO pursues a host of public goods
in addition to deterrence.  These goods include traffic control, navigation, drug interdiction, and
scientific research (Sandler and Hartley, 2001).  Yet other supranational structures, such as the
EU, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), are observed supplying multiple public goods.
What factors are at work in such organizations that encourage them to provide more than
one IPG? The answer involves economies of scope which occur when the cost of providing two
or more IPGs jointly in the same institution is cheaper than supplying them in separate
institutions.  Such scope economies stem from common cost attributable to IPGs.  If two IPGs
can utilize the same administrative staff, communication network, meeting facilities, research
staff, and scientific personnel, then there exists cost in common arising from shared inputs.
Underutilized infrastructure may be the source of some economies of scope.  As an infrastructure
reaches full capacity, a supranational structure must decide if its cheaper to enlarge its capacity to
accommodate additional IPGs, or whether it is more reasonable to assign new IPG decisions to
either specialized institutions under its oversight or to independent institutions. Both practices
are used.  For example, the International Maritime Organization  (IMO) and the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) are specialized UN agencies. In contrast, the World Court and
the World Trade Organization evolved as a new institution; both institutions facilitate dispute25
settlements over property rights and trade, respectively.
Subsidiarity
In a now-classic paper, Mancur Olson (1969) presented the concept of fiscal equivalence
where those affected by the spillovers of a public good should be the ones who decide its
allocation and financing.  Quite simply, the decision-making  jurisdiction should coincide with
the region of spillovers so that only those who are affected get to express their preferences.
"Financing  equivalence"  would dictate that the financial burden for the IPG should only impact
those receiving its benefits. When the political jurisdiction exceeds the range of spillovers, taxes
are then imposed on people (nations) that do not benefit, thus motivating oversupply by those
making the decision.  If, in contrast, the political jurisdiction is a proper subset of the IPG's
range of spillovers, then the undersupply is anticipated as benefits conferred on those outside of
the political jurisdiction are ignored. When, for example, an IPG benefits the people of three
Eastern African countries, either these three nations or some regional organization specific to this
area should address the good's allocation. In some cases, a regional network that connects
nations confronting a common IPG issue needs to form as in the case of river blindness (see
Table 3).  Western African countries engineered a network among themselves to control both the
parasite worm and the person-to-person contagion of the disease. Other partners, such as Merck
and donors, were included to provide financing and to make the drug, Ivermectin, available to
curb the spread of the disease (Ferroni, 2000, p. 17).
Subsidiarity not only places the problem on the most appropriate participants - those with
the most at stake - but it also economizes on transaction cost. Focusing on the proper
participants promotes allocative efficiency. The practice of subsidiarity involves a wide range of26
IPGs. For peacekeeping, NATO's assumption of missions in Bosnia and Kosovo made more
sense than the UN being in charge, since instability in those countries poses a greater threat to
NATO allies than the world at large. Environmental treaties, such as the Helsinki Protocol
curbing sulfur emissions in Europe, are best framed by the Europeans, which tumed out to be the
case.
Even many forms of foreign assistance involving IPGs can be improved by the
subsidiarity principle where a cross-border spillover is handled by the agency whose
geographical mandate is closest to the underlying IPG's range of spillovers.  When the
appropriate agency does not possess the requisite capacity, it is better to augment its capacity
rather than to assign the problem to an organization with a larger geographical jurisdiction,
unless economies of scale and scope warrant otherwise (Kanbur, Sandler, with Morrison, 1999).`
To put this recommendation into practice, the World Bank would have to increase the capacity
of a host of regional banks and, in so doing, would be limiting its own capabilities.
SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR FINANCING
Despite potential free-rider problems, a wide range of IPGs is provided within the
international community by a variety of institutions.  Some institutions provide the necessary
push or the lighter coax needed, while others operate as clubs.  By investigating how these
institutions succeed in financing their IPGs, I am able to show that the properties of the good as
well as other considerations discussed above play a role in the design of these institutions.  Table
3 lists the institutions that I shall briefly examine, and it also gives a short institutional and
financial description.
INTELSAT is an extemal communication network carrying the majority of transoceanic27
messages.  The system consists of 19 geostationary satellites positioned some 22,000 miles
above the equator, from where the satellites orbit the earth in the same time interval that the earth
rotates about its axis, thus leaving each satellite stationary over the earth. A mere three satellites
are sufficient to provide point-to-multipoint service nearly anywhere on the planet.  The other 16
satellites are used either to carry the volume of messages or serve as spares. Redundant backup
satellites increase the system's reliability.
INTELSAT operates as a private consortium with firms, governments, and other
institutions as members.  Since coding and scrambling signals can restrict access to the network,
INTELSAT qualifies as a club good. Utilization of the network can be finely monitored to the
fraction of a second.  As utilization of the communication system increases, the benefit per signal
transmitted diminishes owing to congestion in the form of interference when more signals share
the same frequency bandwidth. Members are charged user fees or tolls solely based on their per-
unit utilization of the network; everyone pays the same toll per unit of transmission, but total
payments differ according to a member's total utilization. Voting at meetings of the Board of
Governors, the supreme decision-making  body of INTELSAT, is weighted according to
members' utilization rates and investment shares.  Such a voting scheme promotes optimality
insofar as heavier users serve more individuals whose MWTP must be aggregated, and thus have
a greater stake in provision and other policy decisions. The financial design of INTELSAT is
based on the benefit principle of equating the sum of MWTP to the marginal cost of provision
through the use of tolls.
Although not listed in Table 3, LANDSAT also operates as a privately owned club that
charges users for remote-sensing surveys of requested areas of the earth.  Originally, LANDSAT
was developed and funded by the US government for military purposes, but was subsequently28
sold to private interests.  A governmental boost was required owing to high R&D cost and the
expense of lifting satellites into orbit. LANDSAT thus represents a case where a government
provided the club with an initial provision and development  push and then allowed the private
sector to take over.  Other international club goods include the Suez and Panama Canals, which
charge tolls per transit.  Internet providers constitute another instance of a club where members
are charged for their use of the network, and proceeds fund increases in the providers'  server
capacity and reliability. Such increases help to limit congestion in the form of connecting and
waiting time.
In Table 3, the second institutional arrangement concerns  UN peacekeeping in which the
UN carries out a variety of peacekeeping, peace enforcement (when the two sides do not agree to
be separated), and humanitarian relief efforts." 4 Following the UN's first sizable operation in the
Congo during 1960-64, it became apparent that UN resources would be stretched too thinly if
such operations were funded from regular membership fees, as originally planned.  Given the
public nature of peacekeeping, early attempts to solicit voluntary contributions yielded little
funding. To create a more pernanent  and reliable funding source, the UN General Assembly
passed a resolution that established ass.ssment accounts, beginning in 1975, for peacekeeping
operations.
These assessment accounts distinguished four classes of payers: the five permanent
members of the Security Council (A); twenty-two developed countries, not pernanent  members
of the Council (B); wealthy developing countries (C); and poorer less-developed countries (D).
Nations in class A and B finance the lion's  share of peacekeeping operations, with permanent
members of the Security Council paying 63% and developed nations in class B paying alrmost
35% on average.  Thus, countries in class C and D underwrite  just 2%. The five countries in29
class A pay 22% more than their regular budget assessment scale to peacekeeping. Thus, the
United States covers 25% of the UN regular budget, but it must fund approximately 31% of
peacekeeping expenses. Group B nations pay their regular budget assessment scale, while Group
C (D) countries pay just one-fifth (one-tenth) of their regular budget assessment scale. Assessed
peacekeeping burdens are intended to be disproportionate in terms of income and, as such,
display strong ability-to-pay equity considerations.  Since nations within designated classes are
treated identically, horizontal equity is also practiced.
Once a UN member is in arrears for its assessed amounts for two full preceding years,
Article 19 of the UN Charter provides that the member can lose its voting privilege in the
General Assembly.  For class A members, this penalty is not as severe as losing its vote on the
Security Council.  Since Council members, and wealthy nations in general, have a greater
interest in peacekeeping, the assessment accounts also apply the benefit principle to a small
extent.  It is, however, clear that the strong elements of nonrivalry, nonexcludability, and best-
shot aggregation mean that a supranational institution is required to provide the push.
The next supranational institution, the United Nations, in Table 3 is one of the most
complex and serves as the umbrella organization for smaller specialized agencies (e.g., WHO,
IMO), which are financed through membership fees, donated trust funds, and UN support. The
UN provides a host of GPGs and IPGs, financed through regular membership fees and voluntary
contributions." 5 Numerous IPGs are supplied so as to take advantage of economies of scope
stemming from common elements of the UN's massive infrastructure,  which can economize on
cost.  Regular membership assessment is guided primarily by ability-to-pay considerations that
stress less vertical equity than was true for peacekeeping assessment accounts.  Assessment
scales are altered periodically to adjust for member nations' changing economic fortunes in terms30
of income.  For example, Russia's membership assessment scale has been reduced since the
breakup of the Soviet Union as the Russian economy shrunk, while Japan's assessment scale has
been increased.  In its role of supplying information, the UN charges for its print and electronic
publications and, in so doing, uses exclusion of impure public goods as a means of establishing a
market in informnation.  Given the vast array of public goods supported by the UN and its
subsidiary organizations, it is not surprising that a variety of financial instruments are used,
guided by the goods' three dimensions of publicness.  Supplemental support from regular
membership fees or specific assessments is required to finance nonrival and nonexcludable
benefits where user fees are not feasible.
NATO is a military alliance that shares deterrence coming from a collective threat of
punishment to any state attacking the territory or interests of a member ally." 6 Established in
1949, NATO has grown from its 12 original allies to 19. Allies share a defense activity that
yields joint products, which vary in their degree of publicness (Sandler and Hartley, 2001). An
arsenal may deter aggression while allowing the provider to pursue its own territorial ambitions,
where deterrence and imperialism are the joint products. An alliance can fulfill at least three
general functions:  (i) deterrence, (ii) damage limitation or protection, and (iii) privatc or ally-
specific benefits.  Deterrence is purely public among the allies and the most subject to free-riding
concerns. In contrast, damage-limiting protection, needed when deterrence fails and war ensues,
is subject to rivalry in the forrn of force thinning as a given contingent of forces is spread to
defend a longer exposed border.  Private or ally-specific benefits occur when a jointly produced
defense output assists the provider, but the output's benefits are not available to others.  Such
private benefits include quelling domestic unrest, controlling domestic terrorism, responding to
national disasters, or patrolling coastal waters.31
As the share of excludable to total defense benefits increases, an alliance can rely on
allies' independent behavior to spend where their benefits are the greatest.  Sandler and Hartley
(1999, 2001) argue that from the 1970s until the present day, a sizable portion of defense benefits
is excludable, so that the benefit principle can be partly satisfied by independent spending
decisions.  In practice, NATO allies do make independent spending choices.  Less than 1% of its
allies' aggregate expenditures on defense is used to commonly fund NATO's civil structure,
infrastructure, and integrated military command, so that over 99% is spent independently by the
allies.  Over the years as weapons technology, the strategic mission, membership composition,
and threat have evolved, the mix of joint products and, thus, the ratio of excludable benefits have
also changed.  As these changes occur, financial arrangements need adjusting; as this ratio
increases (decreases), there is less (more) of a need for explicit coordination among allies.
Recent changes in NATO's strategic mission, which stress peacekeeping and nonproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, have decreased the ratio of excludable benefits - thus calling into
question the wisdom of NATO's loose structure. NATO provision of multiple public goods, as
mentioned earlier, indicates that it is exploiting economies of scope.
The mission of the WHO is the maintenance of world health, which has both country-
specific and worldwide public benefits.  WHO provides services to member governments in the
form of expert guidance, practical projects, health manpower training, and health program
coordination. By coordinating health programs internationally, the WHO aims to foster a
network of transnational cooperation in health practices. Some purely public benefits are
anticipated to arise from such a network, as intelligence on diseases and plagues are shared and
best practices are disseminated. Clearly, country-specific benefits derive from projects and
health manpower training, whereas some rivalry results from expert guidance as a fixed staff32
must cover more countries. Given the presence of joint products, the WHO could be funded by a
combination of user fees and fixed membership charges, with the former covering excludable
benefits and the latter charging for the nonexcludable benefits. But in practice, the WEHO  is a
specialized UN agency supported by membership fees based on ability to pay and donated trust
funds earmarked for specific purposes.
In recent years, there have been a number of transnational environmental treaties to curb
CFCs, sulfur, nitrogen oxides, and other pollutants (Sandler, 1997). Most treaties rely on the
signers to fulfill pledged cutbacks. At the international level, the UN Environmental Program,
supported by UN membership fees, supplies the minimal infrastructure in terms of making treaty
text available and collecting signatures of ratifying countries. The UN through its (ability-to-
pay) membership charge supports this purely public benefit.  The Montreal Protocol on
stratospheric ozone-depleting substances provides for a multilateral trust fund to assist
developing countries acquire the technology to substitute more ozone-friendly substitutes. Not
surprisingly, this fund for what amounts to a pure public good is provided by contributions oII
behalf of just the rich countries and is rather modest in size. Thus, an official push is needed and
received from leader nations. For most treaties, significant country-specific benefits arising from
either joint products or a weighted-sum technology induce ratifiers to finance their own cutbacks
and, in so doing, respond to benefits received.
The EU was originally established to eliminate trade and nontrade barriers among
members by pursuing the free flow of goods, services, people, and capital.  In its trade creation
role, the EU provides a pure IPG to its member states by increasing welfare through static and
dynamic efficiency gains from enhanced specialization of labor and scale economies owing to
the increased size of the market.  Over the years, the EU has evolved from its common market33
purpose and assumed the provision of additional public goods (e.g., security, traffic control,
contract standardization, health standards, pollution cleanup, monetary union, and scientific
discoveries). As such, the EU is another instance where multiple public goods are provided to
exploit economies of scope. These IPGs vary in their characteristics - e.g., contract
standardization represents a best-shot IPG abiding by a coordination game.
The EU is unique among supranational structure in the grandeur of its vision and design -
ideally to create a United States of Europe.  At least three features set EU apart: (i) the use of a
value-added tax on EU exchanges, (ii) a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and (iii) efforts to
redistribute income from rich to poor nations.  These value-added  taxes on consumption not only
finance EU-provided public goods but they also underwrite efforts to redistribute income among
member states. Infrastructure projects have been specifically placed in poorer members to
provide public goods while giving such members an income transfer. Value-added consumption
taxes are more in keeping with an ability-to-pay rather than a benefit principle of taxation. CAP
has diverted trade, added to inefficiency, and caused significant redistributions within and among
member countries to the farm population.  EU's frequent crises illustrate that even nations with
much in common resist sacrificing autonomy easily on monetary, fiscal, and tax policies.
The World Bank is a multilateral agency that provides IPGs in terms of development
assistance, technical advice, and research findings. In addition, the Bank coordinates
development assistance from a host of donors including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
countries, and charitable foundations. Activities of the World Bank vary in their public
characteristics and the presence of joint products.  Some activities - unconditional poverty
alleviation and basic research - are primarily purely public among members, while other
activities - fostering environmental quality and limiting migration - are apt to have the greatest34
impact on host and neighboring countries.
The World Bank is financed by member countries' subscriptions to its capital stock, used
for loans and to support the Bank's activities.  An important country-specific benefit is promoted
by assigning a members' votes in the Bank based on the size of its subscription (World Bank.
1999). In 1999, the United States held over 16% of the votes on the Bank's policies owing tc, its
generous subscription. So in return for carrying a greater burden of the World Bank financin;g,  a
large subscribergains greater autonomy over the Bank's policy decisions and direction. This
support-for-votes practice provides a significant member-specific inducement that helps
circumvent the free-rider problem.  The IMF implements a similar policy.  Institutional design
can provide joint products and promote incentives. This assignment of vote shares stand in stark
contrast to a nation's single vote in the UN General Assembly regardless of the UN financial
burden that a member carries.
In Table 3, the next two institutions - the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and
the International Telecommunication Organization (ITU) - are specialized UN agencies that
oversee international shipping and communication, respectively. Membership fees that nations
willingly pay finance both the IMO and the ITU. International trade and communication
networks must address a number of collective action issues of a weakest-link or best-shot nature
- interoperability or interconnectedness, accidents and mishaps, jurisdictional rights, and
competitive practices (Zacher with Sutton, 1996). For international shipping, the IMO institutes
conventions on accidents and accident prevention, innocent passage, pollution, and other
concerns.  For telecommunications, the ITU establishes practices to curb signal interference and
allocates the frequency bands of the electromagnetic spectrum to various specific purposes. The
ITU also promotes the adoption of standardized equipment. A significant factor inducing nations35
to join these international institutions and to submit to their regulations involves mutual self-
interests in achieving the free flow of trade and communication among nations. Although
nations must sacrifice some autonomy over commerce and communications by satisfying these
regulations, the true loss of autonomy is modest, meaning that the gain from standardized
practices does not have to be great to still provide each nation with a net gain over membership
fees.  Safety at sea and/or freedom from interference along the spectrum represents a weakest-
link public good, whose outcome is determined by the least careful behavior of the participants.
In general, the adoption of standards of behavior or safety conventions denotes a best-shot IPG
and adheres to a coordination game structure, where it is in the interest of each nation to abide by
the agreed-upon conventions and to pay membership fees to support the institutions creating such
conventions.  A nation that defects from a standard is significantly worse off if the others abide.
The final two examples in Table 3 - New Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) and
Onchoceriasis Control Program (OCP) - represent joint public/private partnerships (Ferroni,
2000). MMV involves a partnership that includes WHO, World Bank, Rockefeller Foundation,
the United States, and two associations of pharrnaceutical companies.  This MMV partnership is
fused together to focus resources sufficiently to achieve best-shot IPGs of discovering new
medicines.  By forming this partnership, each participant is asked to make a rather modest
donation to a team in contrast to what would be involved if a participant had to go it alone. In
the case of OCP, the partnership concerns the provision of a weakest-link public good where
incentives are right for the African governments to match one another's contributions. For both
cases, partnerships can provide the necessary funding owing to the supportive incentive structure
associated with the underlying IPG's aggregation technology.36
Common themes and institutions
The design of these organizations illustrates some common themes that underscore the
importance of the earlier theoretical discussion. First, if exclusion is feasible and utilization can
be monitored, then private, nonofficial provision can be financed through a club arrangement.
Second, when a public-sector push is required in the form of a supranational organization,
multiple public goods are frequently provided owing to economies of scope. Many elaborate
supranational institutions address a number of IPG problems. Third, when a push is required,
supranational structures rely on ability-to-pay instruments to fund IPGs, and thus sacrifice
efficiency for feasibility. Fourth, with joint products, more of a coax rather than a push is
provided by the supranational structure as country-specific and club benefits motivate
contributions.  Such structures can remain "loose" with modest common financing and
enforcement efforts - examples include NATO and environmenLal  treaties. Fifth, if a push is
required for weakest-link and best-shot IPGs, then a partnership among private and public
participants may coalesce resources so that either a minimally acceptable level is supplied by all
or the required threshold for success is achieved.
CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Not all GPGs and IPGs are created equal. The three dimensions of these goods -
nonrivalry of benefits, excludability possibilities, and aggregation technology - detenrnine  what
kinds of institutions or transnational actions are required for their provision and financing. In
fact, the international community is devising a rich array of institutional designs and responises  to
fund IPGs.  For purely and impurely public goods where exclusion of nonpayers is not feasible, a
real push is needed by the international community to provide these goods.  A supranational37
structure is then required to institute membership fees or taxes to underwrite the IPGs. For
weakest-link and/or best-shot IPGs, partnerships among public and private institutions can either
ensure that everyone meets acceptable levels of a weakest-link IPG or that sufficient resources
are accumulated to support a best shot-shot IPG.  When club goods are present, users can formn
private collectives and fully finance the shared good with congestion tolls under a variety of
scenarios depending upon production considerations, the nature of crowding, and competitive
conditions.  For activities giving rise to joint products, only a little coaxing from the international
community is necessary if a large share of country-specific  benefits exists or is complementary to
the jointly produced public benefits.  The basic message is simple:  financing does not pose
insurmountable problems for many IPGs.  As researchers gain a better appreciation for how the
nature of IPGs differs, they will acquire insights about the proper actions to support IPGs.  The
transnational community should only explicitly direct scarce resources to those GPGs and IPGs
that need a significant push or else a smaller coax by the transnational community. When clubs
or markets can finance the IPGs, the community should sit back and let incentives guide the
actions of sovereign nations.38
FOOTNOTES
*Todd Sandler is the Robert R. and Katheryn A. Dockson Professor of International
Relations and Economics.
1. The connection between IPGs and global contingencies confronting humankind is
presented in two recent books:  Global Challenges (Sandler, 1997) and Global Public Goods
(Kaul, Grunberg, and Stem, 1999). Also see Sandler (1998) and Kanbur, Sandler, with Morrison
(1999).
2.  This arises as technological advances create goods whose benefits extend beyond the
providing nation - e.g., hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are new refrigerants without ozone-
destroying side effects. Technology also increases digital-based communication and, thus, the
spread of knowledge via optical cables and satellite linkages. This diffusion not only serves as
an intermediate input for IPGs but also enhances the demand for these goods. Furthermnore,
digital technologies foster the universality of knowledge and, in some instances, assist in
supporting a property-rights regime for IPGs' distribution.
3.  An exception is the European Union, which has the power to collect tax revenues from
member governments.
4.  The issue of how the international community prioritizes arnong alternative IPGs is
not addressed in this paper except to note that ideally this should hinge on the sum of the
associated marginal willingness to pay (Comes and Sandler, 1996, Chapter 6) and marginal cost
of provision.
5.  If neutrality applies, then collective provision can reduce private provision, and can
result in no increase in the overall level of the public good. However, neutrality does not result
in a smaller overall level of the public good.39
6.  On clubs and their toll arrangements, see Buchanan (1965), Comes and Sandler (1996,
Chapters 11-13), and Sandler and Tschirhart (1997).
7. Clubs involve at least two allocative choices: the provision level and the membership
size.  The choice of the toll fixes the membership size. These two decisions are interdependent
and must be made simultaneously.
8.  With a homogeneous of degree zero congestion function, any increase in crowding
from further utilization just offsets the decrease in crowding from greater provision as utilization
and provision increase proportionally (Comes and Sandler, 1996, pp. 272-277, 391-393).
9. The first treatment of alternative aggregate technologies is by Hirshleifer (1983) who
refers to them as the social composition function. Numerous aggregation technologies are
analyzed in Arce M. and Sandler (2001), Comes (1993), Sandler (1992), Sandler and Sargent
(1995), Vicary (1994), and Vicary and Sandler (2001). In a foreign assistance context, Ferroni
(2000), Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999), and Kanbur, Sandler, with Morrison (1999) address the
importance of alternative aggregation technologies.
10. Other important aggregation technologies include better-shot, weaker-link, and
threshold.  For a threshold IPG, a minimal level must be provided before any benefits are
received.
11. Assurance games are a special subclass of coordination games.  On the strategic
implications associated with weaker-link public goods, see Arce M. and Sandler (2001). For
weaker-link public goods, the smallest contribution has the largest marginal influence on utility,
followed by the second-smallest contribution, and so on.  Also see Comes (1993).
12. This aspect is coordinated by the United Nations Environmental Programs (UNEP),
which also administers environmental treaties.40
13. The existence of economies of scope clashes with an ideal notion of subsidiarity.  A
framework for subsidiarity that acknowledges economies of scale and economies of scope needs
to be formulated.
14. See Sandier and Hartley (1999, Chapter 4; 2001) on UN peacekeeping and its
financial arrangements.
15. Although voluntary contributions are a source of funding, such contributions
represent a very small share of UN total financing.
16. Sandler and Hartley (1999, Chapter 2) provide an institutional description of NAT  O.41
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Table 1.  International  Public Goods:  Alternative Types and Financing Possibilities
Good Type  Examples  Financing possibilities  Remarks
Xpure public  X curbing global warming  Usually must rely on some kind of public-sector push  There are neutrality worries since
X basic research  based on an ability-to-pay charge.  Financing  voluntary contributions will be crowded
X limiting spread of disease  coordinated by a supranational organization using  out by collective contributions.  Partial
X augmenting ozone shield  some international taxation or fee arrangement.  A  cooperation faces free-riding offsets
leader nation or nations might exist if sufficient net  unless there is sufficient participation.
benefits can be derived.  Enforcement mechanism is necessary.
Ximpurely  public with  X ocean fisheries  Must again rely on supranational organization and  More private incentives to contribute.
some rivalry but no  X controlling pests  some international collection arrangement.  Rivalry  Rivalry lessens neutrality concems, but
exclusion  X curbing organized crime  may motivate more independent behavior in contrast  a push from the public sector is still
X alleviating acid rain  to purely public goods.  required.
Ximpurely  public with  X missile defense system  Exclusion promotes voluntary financing and club-like  Since exclusion is not complete, some
some exclusion  X disaster relief aid  structures.  For these goods, the public sector may be  suboptimality would remain.  Question
X extension services  needed for coaxing and facilitating eventual private-  is whether this residual suboptimality
X information dissemination  sector provision. There may exist an entrepreneurial  warrants any intervention or official
or leader nation to market the good.  inducements.
Xclub good  X transnational  parks  Charge each use according to crowding that results.  Can result in an efficient outcome.
X INTELSAT  Nonpayers are excluded. Toll per use is equal to  Clubs limit transaction costs. Full
X  remote-sensing services  marginal crowding costs so as to internalize the  financing is dependent on scale
•  canals, waterways  congestion externality. Taste differences can be  economies, the form of the congestion
X canals,  waterways  reflected by tolls paid on total visits. Nations with a  functions, and other considerations (e.g.,
greater demand visit more often and pay more than  competitiveness of factor or output
those with a smaller demand.  markets).  No public coaxing needed.
Xjoint products  X foreign aid  As nation-specific private benefits and club good  Ratio of excludable to total benefits is
X tropical forests  benefits become more prevalent among the joint  the essential consideration.  As ratio
X peacekeeping  products, markets and club arrangements can be used  approaches one, markets and clubs work
•  defense spending among  to finance the good with greater efficiency.  As the  more fully.  Institutional arrangements
allies  share of excludable benefits increases, payments can  can foster these excludable benefits.
be increasingly based on benefits received.46
Table 2.  Alternative Aggregation  Technologies of Public Supply
Supply  technology  Exanmples  Strategic  considerations  Institutional  implicationzs
• summation: public good  * curbing air pollution  Characterized often by Prisoner's Dilemma  In an assistance context, there is a
level equals sum of  * reducing global warming  or chicken game form. In the former, there  need for a multilateral organization or
individual contributions  * cataloguing species  are strong incentives to free ride and not  rich nation to assume leadership and
contribute; in the latter, there is an incentive  to provide the public good.  Canlot
on behalf of the richest to inhibit dire  typically rely on voluntary action at
consequences.  the national level.
* weakest-link: only the  * containing river blindness  Assurance games where matching behavior  Multilateral agencies can channel
smallest effort determines  * maintaining the integrity of  characterizes the equilibria. Actions and/or  funds and direct actions to raise
the public good level  networks  contracts are self-enforcing. Well-endowed  public good levels to acceptable
l  limiting the spread of  players have an incentive to assist those less  standards.  Capacity building required
insurrections  well-off.  in poor countries.  Rich countries may
contribute the public good directly to
increase levels in poorer countries.
Partnerships apply.
* best-shot: only the largest  * finding a cure for AIDS  Coordination games where only a single  Put supply efforts where the prospects
effort determines the public  * neutralizing a pest  provider is required. Problem of  and resources are the greatest for
good level  * engineering the next green  identifying this agent if there are two or  success.  Multilateral organizations or
revolution  more candidates - this is where  a leader nation can serve to coalesce
coordination is needed.  For development  and focus resources and efforts.
concerns, problems arise when best-  Partnerships among various
endowed nation derives little benefit from  participants can circumvent collective
the action.  action problems.
* weighted sum: each  * cleanup of sulfur emissions  Weighted sum implies that some  Multilateral organizations need to
country's contribution can  * monitoring the planet from  participants receive greater private benefits  support efforts among only those
have a different additive  different vantages  and thus have greater inducements to  nations with less country-specific
impact  * controlling a pest  contribute. Captures pure public and  benefits.  Collect and provide
private good representations as special  information on the weight matrix to
cases. A host of alternative game forms.  encourage independent financing.47
Table 3.  Examples of Supranational Institutions and Their Financing Arrangement
Institution  Institutional description  Financial arrangement
XINTELSAT  An external communication satellite network with  Operates as a club with charges to members
countries and firms as members of a consortium.  based on tolls taking account of congestion.
Satellites positioned in geostationary space provide  Total tolls differ based on total utilization.
global communication.
XUN Peacekeeping  Since 1975, countries are assessed shares to support each  Countries are distinguished by four categories
operation. Voting privilege in the General Assembly can  based on ability to pay (horizontal and
be suspended for a nonpayer if assessments are too far in  vertical equity) and benefit principle.  Strong
arrears.  vertical equity considerations dominate.
XUnited Nations  The United Nations provides a host of GPGs and IPGs  Financing is based on ability to pay with a
through its regular membership fees and members=  strong emphasis on vertical equity and UN
voluntary contributions.  These public goods differ  status.  Less vertical equity than
according to exclusion, nonrivalry, and joint products.  peacekeeping assessments.  Voluntary
Economies of scope being exploited.  contributions are small part of funding.
XNATO  An alliance established in 1949 which has grown from  99.5% of allies= expenditures on defense are
12 to 19  allies.  Article 5 indicates that an attack on one  done independently, while only 0.5% are
ally will be viewed as an attack on all allies.  Mission has  done commonly to maintain infrastructure,
changed numerous times and now involves crisis  NATO civil structure, and NATO military
management and nonproliferation of weapons of mass  command.  Defense spending appears based
destruction.  Multiple public goods provided to exploit  on the benefit principle owing to high ratio of
economies of scope.  excludable benefits.
XWHO  Mission is to pursue the maintenance of world health.  Based on membership assessments and thus
Part of the United Nations.  Joint products are present.  ability to pay.  Also based on donated trust
funds for specific purposes.
XEnvironmental  Agreements to curb various pollutants including CFCs,  Montreal Protocol on CFCs relies on a
treaties  sulfur, nitrogen oxides, and GHGs.  multilateral fund with contributions based on
ability to pay.  Most treaties depend on
members financing their own cutbacks based
on the benefit principle.48
Table 3. continue p. 2
Institution  Institutional description  Financial arrangement
Economic Union to eliminate trade and nontrade barriers  Value-added taxes on exchanges within the
among members.  EU pursues the free movement of  EU is used to finance public goods and
goods, services, people, and capital. Public good of  infrastructure linking EU members. Taxation
trade creation within union and gains in efficiency (i.e.,  abides by ability to pay rather than benefit
specialization of labor, economies of scale, and growth).  principle.  Significant redistribution and
A host of other public goods of varying purity and joint  inefficiency tied to the Common Agricultural
products (e.g., security, traffic control, contract  Policy.
conventions, and health standards). Also income
redistribution practiced.  Economies of scope are being
exploited.
A multilateral agency providing development assistance,  Financing for the bank's activities come from
XWorld Bank  technical advice, and research findings.  It also  member countries' subscriptions to the capital
coordinates development assistance from other donors  stock.  Country-specific inducements for
(e.g., nongovernmental organizations and bilateral  subscribing derive, in part, from its number of
donors). The Bank's activities vary in their degree of  votes, which is based directly on its
publicness and the presence ofjoint  products.  subscription.  Larger subscribers obtain a
Alleviation of poverty with little or no conditionality has  greater number and, thus, share of votes on
a large share of purely public benefits.  The Bank's  Bank's policies.
research outputs possess mostly purely public benefits.
For international shipping, IMO oversees international  IMO is a UN specialized agency financed
XInternational  trade and institutes conventions on accidents and  through membership fees. Nations willing to
Maritime  accident prevention, innocent passage, pollution, and  sacrifice autonomy to achieve coordination
Organization (IMO)  other concerns.  and public good of safety that results.
ITU establishes practices to curb signal interference and  ITU is a UN specialized agency financed
XInternational  allocates the frequency bands of electromagnetic  through membership fees.  In nations'
Telecommunication  spectrum to purposes and countries. Promotes adoption  interests to achieve cooperation.
Union (ITIJ)  of standardized  equipment.49
Table 3. continue p. 3
Institution  Institutional description  Financial arrangement
XNew Medecines for  A joint public/private partnership to control malaria that  Funding comes from multilateral agencies,
XNew  M  eecines  for  involves WHO, World Bank, Rockefeller Foundation,  donor countries, nonprofits, foundations and
Malaria Venture  the United States, Intemational Federation of  NGOs.  Some pharmaceutical firms will
(MMV)  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, and the  partner drug discovery projects by lending
Association of British Pharmaceutical Industries. Aim is  their expertise and facilities.  MMV will
to discover and develop new drugs for the treatment and  approach industrial partners to manufacture
prevention of malaria.  and market newly discovered and effective
drugs.  High-risk activity of discovery being
collectively funded by multilaterals and other
donors.  Pooling of efforts to achieve best-
shot discovery.
In operation in West Africa for over 25 years to control  Funding supplied by the various participants
river blindness from a parasitic worm. Partners include  with Merck making Ivermectin available for
Control Program  multilaterals, Merck Corporation, African governments,  free.  Control of river blindness and its
(OCP)  local communities, bilateral donors, foundations, and  contagion is an example of a weakest-link
NGOs.  Exploit participants' comparative advantage.  public good.
Note:  Source  for MMV  and OCP is Ferroni  (2000, pp.  10, 17).Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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